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Abstract 
Many digital solutions mainly involving Bluetooth technology are being proposed for Contact Tracing 
Apps (CTA) to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Concerns have been raised regarding privacy, consent, uptake 
required in a given population, and the degree to which use of CTAs can impact individual behaviours. However, 
very few groups have taken a holistic approach and presented a combined solution. None has presented their 
CTA in such a way as to ensure that even the most suggestible member of our community does not become 
complacent and assume that CTA operates as an invisible shield, making us and our families impenetrable or 
immune to the disease. We propose to build on some of the digital solutions already under development that, 
with addition of a Bayesian model that predicts likelihood for infection supplemented by traditional symptom 
and contact tracing, that can enable us to reach 90% of a population. When combined with an effective 
communication strategy and social distancing, we believe solutions like the one proposed here can have a very 
beneficial effect on containing the spread of this pandemic.   
Introduction 
At the time of writing many of us are in our fifth or sixth week of social distancing and lockdown in an effort, 
we were told, that would flatten the curve and curtail the spread of COVID-19. As considerations move from 
dealing with the worst of the disease to containment of any remaining pockets of infection, much noise is 
being made in the media concerning the need to implement contact tracing apps (CTA) before the world 
can return ostensibly to normal (Mathews, 2020; Scott, 2020; Whittaker, 2020; Drew 2020). While the 
claimed benefits for CTA of being able to leave our homes, reopen workplaces and revive crippled 
economies are significant, CTA are not without some controversy (Lomas, 2020; Volk, 2020). Questions 
regarding transmission dynamics and optimal intervention strategies for the disease, and the risk CTA pose 
to individual privacy and efficacy are repeatedly raised, and many feel these have not been adequately 
answered (Crocker et al, 2020; Sun & Viboud, 2020). Some describe CTA as the trojan horse: reminding 
us that many governments and corporations already operate population-wide electronic surveillance and 
the likelihood that they do not, and once they also get access to our CTA data, will not, act in good faith 
(Lomas, 2020). However, what everyone fails to ask is whether this personal information is being provided 
in support of the most, or even an effective method and at what uptake rate in the general population are 
we sure that it will be worthwhile. Is a Bluetooth radio beacon paired to a smartphone app the most effective 
method for digital contact tracing? In this paper we address these key questions for smartphone-based 
contact tracing solutions. 
What is Contact Tracing? 
Proposed more than 80 years ago for the control of syphilis (Paran, 1937), contact tracing is a surveillance 
and containment strategy for infectious disease (Vazquez-Prokopec et al, 2017). Rather than managing 
only isolated cases as they seek medical attention, contact tracing follows the path of infection from 
diagnosed patients to those with whom they have been in close physical contact (Armbruster & Brandeau, 
2007; Eames, 2007; Vazquez-Prokopec et al, 2017). Several approaches for contact tracing have been 
described in the literature, including: first-order, single-step, iterative and retrospective (Eames, 2007; 
Klinkenberg et al, 2006). First-order tracing only identifies those people the patient immediately came into 
contact with, and advises them of potential exposure and the need to seek medical advice or self-isolate. It 
does not concern itself with tracing the contacts of contacts, leaving that second-order process to occur as 
and when the first-order contact seeks medical care. Single-step contact tracing identifies all people that 
the infected person came into contact with, and as any of those are also identified as infected, their contacts 
are identified and the process continues. One issue with single-step contact tracing is that asymptomatic 
infecteds can spread the disease until they are detected and isolated. In contrast, Iterative contact tracing 
continues to track and re-apply the relevant diagnostic test to contacts iteratively before their infection may 
even be detected through symptom screening. The process continues until no further infecteds are 
identified. The final type, Retrospective contact tracing, follows the same process as either single-step or 
iterative with the addition that it also operates in reverse by considering the people with which the infected 
patient had been in contact with in their recent past, with the goal to identify who it was that infected the 
patient. Each approach is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: (a) first order; (b) single-step; (c) iterative; and (d) retrospective contact tracing. 
 
Contact tracing has traditionally been conducted as a manual multi-stage process that begins when a 
patient is diagnosed with an infection that is usually also subject to notification rules that require the clinician 
to apprise the health authority (HA) of the infected’s status. Any likely contacts of the infected patient are 
determined, identified, advised of their exposure status and encouraged to seek medical advice (Armbruster 
& Brandeau, 2007; Eames, 2007). Generally, contact tracing has only been used for diseases with low 
prevalence: meaning diseases where there is only a small number of cases in the community at any given 
time (Armbruster & Brandeau, 2007). Examples of diseases where contact tracing has been applied 
include: tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Ebola and sexually transmitted diseases (Armbruster & Brandeau, 2007; 
Danquah et al, 2019; Eames, 2007; Yasaka et al, 2020). On review, many of these examples show the 
efficacy and reliability of contact tracing to be uncertain and contentious issues. 
Modern contact tracing using wireless beacons 
With our vastly increased global population, international airline travel, megacities and mass transit, it is 
unlikely that traditional contact tracing alone could contain even a minimally contagious disease (Niehus et 
al., 2020). Traditional contact tracing was used early-on during the SARS epidemic (Fidler, 2004; Huat, 
2006). However, it failed to contain the infection which quickly spread through the wider community, with 
global HAs realising that new approaches were now required (Fidler, 2004; Huat, 2006). Modern contact 
tracing approaches have been proposed using ubiquitous and pervasive smartphones and the wireless 
technologies they contain to record and report when we have come into close physical contact with others. 
It is believed this automated contact tracing will overcome situations when we either are not aware of, or 
don’t recall, every contact incident (Maghdid & Ghafoor, 2020). The proposed approaches shown in Figure 
2 incorporate these technologies to more efficiently and effectively provide: (a) movement-focused mobile-
assisted automatic contact recording; (b) contact identification; (c) contact notification; and, (d) narrowcast 
messaging (Maghdid & Ghafoor, 2020; Vazquez-Prokopec et al, 2017; Yasaka et al, 2020). Proponents of 
CTA claim, possibly disingenuously given their extensive and publicly-funded investment in development 
of the app, that installing the app will significantly reduce the chance of you passing on the infection to your 
family and friends (COVIDSafe App, 2020), and essential to keeping your family safe from COVID-19 
(Hamilton, 2020).  
 
 
Figure 2: Modern applications of contact tracing using smart devices 
 
(a) CTA automatically records anonymous IDs of other devices that come within the broadcast distance of the 
wireless technology being used (Bluetooth or wifi). 
(b) Central server operated by health authority or a technology supplier maintains the linking table that can 
identify all users of CTA. 
(c) When an infected person (in RED) notifies the CTA of their positive diagnosis, the central server advises 
all CTA users who have been in close physical contact with the infected that they should seek medical 
advice. 
(d) The central server can also be used to send narrowcast messages, for example: alerting people who CTA 
location tracing identified near a particular infection hotspot during a defined period (in GREEN) that they 
may have been exposed and to seek medical advice.  
 
While solutions using WiFi MAC address sniffing (Lu et al, 2020), GPS (Finazzi, 2020; Klopfenstein et al, 
2020; Maghdid & Ghafoor, 2020) and cellular network geolocating (DP3T, 2020; PEPP-PT, 2020) have all 
been proposed, many believe Bluetooth tracing to be the most suitable for use in CTA (Berke et al, 2020; 
Brack et al, 2020). Authors point to the fact that Bluetooth has already been demonstrated effective for 
proximity detection (Berke et al, 2020; Brack et al, 2020). It is also claimed that while Bluetooth has an 
effective range of around 25-30 metres, signal strength can be used to effectively identify whether another 
device is within the 2-metre rule promoted as a component of social distancing (Berke et al, 2020; Brack et 
al, 2020; Xia & Lee, 2020).   
CTA Data Points and Privacy 
Most attention to privacy in the literature focuses on the interactions and data passing between users of the 
CTA when they come into close physical contact and their devices handshake. A smaller focus is given to 
interactions between the CTA and HA server, whose privacy exposure is mitigated, it is claimed, by 
decentralised solutions: that is, solutions where most data remains on the user’s device and only small 
push or pull transactions occur to the HA server to either advise the system of the user’s COVID-19 
diagnosis, or verify that the user has not already been in contact with another who has since been 
diagnosed. What is clear is that while labelling their solutions as privacy-preserving, most authors seek to 
mitigate one form of data or privacy loss while ignoring, intentionally or not, every other possible disclosure 
vector (Kuhn et al, 2020). To the best of our knowledge, no author considered the issue of metadata and 
its effect in nullifying their often complicated and expensive privacy solutions.  
  Metadata is the most common and easily accessible form of personal information being collected 
(McLachlan, 2016). Metadata is defined as information about a communication: the who, when, where, and 
how but not the what. Metadata contains sufficient information to know when you made a call, texted, 
emailed or accessed a web page, who your communication or web request was made to, how and whether 
the person or system at the other end received the communication. The only thing metadata does not 
contain is the actual content of the message (Maurushat et al, 2015). For more than a decade metadata 
has been used by law enforcement and others to draw inferences about our state of mind, intentions, 
previous travel, personal associations and interactions (Maurushat et al, 2015; McLachlan, 2016). In many 
countries metadata may be accessed without a warrant by authorised organisations and agents, and laws 
exist requiring telecommunications, internet service provider companies and web hosts to maintain large 
stores of metadata collected as a result of the activities of individual subscribers (Maurushat et al, 2015; 
McLachlan, 2016; Shamsi et al, 2018).  
Let us consider the data that is generated while using a CTA. Figure 3 presents the typical CTA 
use-case described by many authors, in which: (a) the primary CTA user and others install and register the 
app on their smartphones; (b) as they move around and come into close physical contact with each other, 
their smartphones identify other smartphones and a contact trace is recorded; (c) an upload of some 
information passes from the CTA on the users device, via their provider’s core network (cellular or ISP); (d) 
from their provider, via the internet, to the HA servers; and (e) alerts and updates can also be sent from the 
HA server to individuals, or every user. Some variation is observed in the literature claiming to present 
privacy-preserving methods regarding: (i) the type of information passed from the CTA to the health 
authority server; and (ii) whether the data passes directly to the HA server or, as with the Singapore 
(TraceTogether), Australian (COVIDSafe) and proposed Apple/Google collaboration examples, into a third-
party supplier’s international datacentre cloud network (i.e. Google, Apple or Amazon Web Services) before 
being received by the HA server (Maddocks, 2020). 
 
 
Figure 3: The Typical CTA scenario 
 
Metadata are generated at every step of the typical CTA scenario. Every communication or request 
sent to cellular, internet service provider or web host organisations results in metadata that must be stored 
in logs in their network that identify you from your subscriber identity module (SIM) record matched to the 
details of your device, with a record of what you requested or sent, to or from whom, and when (De Carli et 
al, 2020; McLachlan, 2016; Shamsi et al, 2018). All digital traffic passing from your provider’s network via 
the internet to the HA results in metadata being captured inin the systems of every network provider 
between the two, but more importantly, in the HA’s network systems and servers. Believed by many to be 
non-sensitive, metadata often remains overlooked in smartphone and internet-facing solutions even though 
it can be a trivial matter to re-identify an individual and their actions and interactions with others from the 
metadata, or digital breadcrumbs, they create (Ho et al, 2018; Maurushat et al, 2015; Perez et al, 2018; 
Shamsi et al, 2018).  
CTAs for COVID-19 
While Singapore and Australia’s Health Departments have already commenced rollout of CTA solutions for 
COVID-19, the United Kingdom (UK), North America and most of Europe will only commence their trial 
deployments in the coming week (Hern & Sabbagh, 2020). Taiwan, South Korea and Israel were even more 
proactive, with increased testing, quarantines and mandated CTA of recent travellers and the infected that 
has resulted in lower rates of secondary infections and significantly fewer deaths, with alarms being raised, 
similar to home detention systems for criminals, informing police if those in quarantine left the building in 
which they were being housed (Lee, 2020; Lomas, 2020b). Most literature proposing CTA and being used 
by academics and governments to support efforts, efficacy and expenditure of public funds for COVID-19 
contact tracing with smartphones, are theoretical solutions in hurriedly prepared preprints that are yet to 
undergo rigorous testing or peer review. Examples include: (Berke et al, 2020; Brack et al, 2020; De Carli 
et al, 2020; Hekmati et al, 2020; Klopfenstein et al, 2020; Maghdid & Ghafoor, 2020; Reichart et al, 2020; 
Xia et al, 2020). While acknowledging that privacy is not a design goal for any CTA, many propose solutions 
that they claim are privacy-preserving: both between app users generally, and between individuals and the 
health authority and technology suppliers who maintain the central servers (Brack et al, 2020; Reichert et 
al, 2020). Only one paper was identified in this work that acknowledged no privacy could exist where there 
was a central authority, and that users should only expect solutions to keep them blinded from each other 
(Berke et al, 2020). 
Some solutions present as a confusing array of seemingly random technology, thrust together 
(Reichart et al, 2020). Apps proposing ID hashing or public/private key encryption between central server 
and end-user claim these additions ensure complete user privacy: and while authors acknowledge that the 
central server will have recorded your current and all previous hashIDs and will be used to distribute alerts 
to other users, they also disingenuously claim that the health authority are entirely unable to learn anything 
at all about users, the infected, or their contact history from this vast collection of data (Brack et al, 2020). 
Many proclaim CTA ineffective because it relies on willing individuals who must provide identifying 
information about themselves and those they come into contact with, and self-report their infected status 
via the app for storage on a central server (Brack et al, 2020; Hekmati, 2020; Yasaka et al, 2020). Usually, 
while simultaneously claiming to provide a decentralised or privacy-protecting solution that still uses user 
IDs and other information such as location or contact lists that are uploaded or shared via the central server 
(Brack et al, 2020; Hekmati et al, 2020; Reichert et al, 2020; Yasaka et al, 2020). However, decentralisation 
adds complexity (Berke et al, 2020), often without a significant improvement in privacy. In one case an 
infected still self-reports, except that they are instead required to provide a signed medical certificate, 
exposing even more personal information to whomever runs the central server so that an alert can be 
broadcast to others who the infected has previously been in contact with (Hekmati et al, 2020). 
Efficacy of CTA 
Researchers and epidemiologists have sought, somewhat unsuccessfully, to understand the efficacy and 
overall value of disease contact tracing for many years, with heightened interest often observed in the 
aftermath of disease outbreaks. Many issues limit contact tracing efficacy, the most significant being the 
need to understand transmission, susceptibility, prevalence, and latency for the target disease (Kiss et al, 
2005). Before deciding on an effective control strategy, it is essential to understand the course of the 
disease. In epidemiology, many compartmental models have been developed for modelling infectious 
diseases (Roddam, 2001; Hethcote, 2000). One commonly used model computes the theoretical number 
of people infected with a contagious disease in a closed population over time is the Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model (Anderson, 1991; Rodrigues, 2016). These mathematical models are being 
considered an important source of knowledge for global governments making life-or-death decisions 
regarding management of COVID-19. The Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model has 
been used to focus on transmission of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China (Lin et al, 2020), and to compare 
outcomes for different containment policies (Casella, 2020). The Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered-Dead 
(SIRD) model has been used to provide estimations of the basic reproduction number (R0), per day 
infection mortality and recovery rates, and attempts to forecast the evolution of an outbreak at the epicentre 
three weeks in advance (Anastassopoulou et al., 2020). Susceptible-Infected-Diagnosed-Ailing-
Recognized- Threatened-Healed-Extinct (SIDARTHE) was proposed as an extension to SIR in an effort to 
model the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy (Giordano et al., 2020). Their model showed that enforced lockdowns 
could be mitigated in the presence of widespread testing (Peto, 2020) and contact tracing, strongly 
contributing to rapid resolution of the epidemic. Similar findings were also found in (Hellewell et al., 2020).  
While some believed contact tracing was effective during the SARS outbreaks of the early 2000’s (Kiss et 
al, 2005), we have already discussed Singapore’s reliance on contact tracing during that period and how 
on review it was found to have failed (Fidler, 2004; Huat, 2006). Other examples where contact tracing 
failed, in some cases even with the use of smartphone technology and apps, include an audit of contact 
tracing use for tuberculosis (Hussain et al, 1992; Mwongela, 2018); the Foot and Mouth outbreak in the UK 
in 2001 (Kiss et al, 2005; Kao, 2003); and the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic in West Africa (Danquah et al, 2019). 
While many claim suitability, viability and effectiveness for CTA, in most cases the CTA solution they 
propose has yet to be prototyped, and for those that were, trialled in anything approaching a real-world 
situation (Brack et al, 2020; De Carli et al, 2020; Hekmati et al, 2020; Klopfenstein et al, 2020; Mwongela, 
2018; Yasaka et al, 2020).  
We sought to understand how effective CTA 
might be as a containment approach for COVID-19 in 
highly populous locations like London or Birmingham 
in the UK, or Sydney and Melbourne in Australia. We 
observed that most papers presenting a CTA 
appeared to silently apply best-case assumptions 
when discussing or evaluating their models in order to 
paint their solution in the best light. For consistency, 
we chose to continue this practice albeit with the novel 
addition of transparency. With respect to how many 
people an infected person may come into contact with, 
we rely on the calculations provided in the UK that 
have come to be known as the Oxford figures and have 
been used by those developing and promoting the 
need for an NHS-specific app, and in the media, to 
support efficacy, funding and deployment of the NHS 
app (Merrick, 2020). The authors used an SEIR model 
to suggest that in a 14-day period post-lockdown the 
average person comes into contact with 217 people, of which 59 are considered to be close contacts 
sufficient for disease transmission, and of those 36 would be individuals in a CTA scenario who are 
potentially traceable (Keeling et al, 2020). While we could have worked from the number of 59 close 
contacts which would have made our numbers significantly larger and more dramatic, in order to 
demonstrate the fallacy of claims made in support of CTA even as a component in disease containment for 
COVID-19, we chose again to work from a best-case position and elected to use latter and much lower 
figure for total transmissions. The Oxford figures also provide that the average latent period, usually defined 
as the period between when a person is exposed to the virus and when they begin exhibiting symptoms, is 
4 days (Keeling et al, 2020). Other authors using larger datasets provided this incubation period was 5 
days, with 97% of patients showing symptoms at day 12 (Lauer et al, 2020; Qi et al, 2020). Younger infected 
patients tend to be asymptomatic, and for longer periods, and while the mean serial interval, the time 
between when symptoms appear in infector and infectee) varies between 4 and 7.5 days (Du et al, 2020; 
Qi et al, 2020). It should be noted that our best-case assumptions are similar to those of Dr Hannah Fry’s 
group (Kucharski et al, 2020) except that our mean delay from symptoms to isolation was reduced to 1 day: 
the effect of which would be to reduce the number of secondary infecteds created by each primary in our 
scenarios. In spite of this, our results were statistically similar to those of Kucharski et al (2020). 
The assumptions used in our calculations include that: 
a) The infection clock starts from exposure; 
b) From day 5 the infected begins to shed the virus; 
c) Patients may become symptomatic between days 5.5 and 11.5; 
d) At day 12 every infected is considered to by symptomatic; 
e) Each infected comes into close contact with 36 people in a 14-day period, pro rata for the 
period between day 5 and when they become symptomatic; 
f) Every infected has self-isolated from day 13; 
Literature Review 
We searched PubMed, medRxiv, bioRxiv, arXiv and 
DOAJ for peer-reviewed articles and preprints that 
mentioned the terms “contact tracing”, and “COVID-
19”. Our initial search revealed more than 1300 
articles published since December 2019. We 
narrowed our search to those articles published since 
March 2020 and selected only those that proposed a 
CTA solution. This identified a collection of 72 papers 
whose solutions were reviewed. From these papers 
59 (89%) used the term privacy in either the title,  
abstract or introduction, and 52 (72%) proposed 
solutions claimed to be privacy-preserving. Solutions 
intended to reduce or eliminate data passing to a 
central server, described as decentralised solutions, 
were proposed in 19 (26%). Only 3 (4% ) solutions 
described production of a prototype with 1 (1%) 
solution having been tested with simulated data. 
For the 6 o’clock path shown in Figure 4, we present the absolute best-case scenario where 100% 
of the population have smartphones, install the CTA, are tested, immediately self-report and self-isolate. 
This scenario, whilst being quite impossible, would actually contain the disease in only two cycles, or 14 
days.  
 
 
Figure 4: COVID-19 CTA Infection Scenarios 
 
The 3 and 9 o’clock paths present the UK and Australian scenarios for the claimed 60% (Merrick, 
2020) and 40% (Woodley, 2020) adoption that we are told would deliver CTA success in their respective 
populations. In each scenario every infected spreads COVID-19 to only a small number of infecteds, and 
while a percentage of secondary infecteds are alerted through the CTA and self-isolated, the remaining 
percentage, those without the app, persist to spread the infection to a significantly large number of people. 
Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the progress at each stage for the 60% adoption NHS CTA 
scenario. 
 
 
Figure 5: Visual representation for the 60% CTA user NHS scenario 
 
Smartphone penetration for adults in the UK has only achieved 79%, reducing to 40% in the key 
COVID-19 demographic, the over-65s. Australian figures are similar. To get 60% penetration in the overall 
UK population, more than three quarters (76%) of all smartphone owners must install, register and use the 
app. This assumes absolutely no loss to follow-up, which occurs where a user either stops using or removes 
the app from their device for any reason. When the average loss to follow-up in a clinical trial is 6% (Akl et 
al, 2012), the NHS app would actually require more than 82% of the smartphone-owning population to 
initially install and register the app to increase the probability that 60% will use their CTA to completion.  
 For the 40% (Australian) and 60% (UK) scenarios we begin from the position that 40% and 60% of 
the population respectively have installed the app and immediately self-report and/or self-isolate when 
alerted. As these scenarios played out, we calculated under an absolute best-case wherein people who 
were alerted by the app or who reached day 13 all immediately self-isolated. The issue with this is that we 
know some people’s symptoms will not be severe enough at first for them to believe they have the disease 
and seek medical advice. This is human nature. Studies report that around 18% of all exposed people 
remain asymptomatic but recover from the virus in a timeframe similar to that of people who do become 
symptomatic (Mizumoto et al, 2020; Day, 2020). Further, 1-2% of patients will be asymptomatic but remain 
contagious and continue to shed the virus from 1-3 months after their initial exposure, with or without a 
symptomatic period (Bengali, 2020). In keeping with our best-case model we have not incorporated 
additional potential exposures that would arise from these groups of people in our calculations. 
A final set of calculations was performed seeking the sweet spot: that number below absolute for 
CTA adoption in the overall population where the number of secondary cases was manageable by manual 
contact tracing and other containment methods, and the NHS generally. Table 1 presents the results of 
those calculations and, similar to figures proposed by other groups who have evaluated this issue 
(Bulchandani et al, 2020), we find the sweet spot for CTA uptake in order to control COVID-19 lies 
somewhere between 90 and 95%. As discussed, such high uptake is simply not credible or possible. 
 
Table 1: Number of additional infecteds created per one infected, based on % of the population installing 
and immediately complying with the CTA 
Day: 12 14 16 18 20 
95% 18.0 4.5 4.7 5.1 6.2 
90% 18.0 9.0 9.9 11.3 16.0 
80% 18.0 18.0 21.6 27.0 46.8 
 
*NB - While estimates suggest 94% of UK adults owns a mobile telephone 
(https://www.tigermobiles.com/blog/mobile-phone-usage-statistics/) only 79% of those over 18 in 
have a smartphone (source: https://www.finder.com/uk/mobile-internet-statistics ) and only 40% 
over 65 - the key demographic for infection and death from COVID-19. 
Proposed and current COVID-19 Solutions 
This paper has considered many of the barriers that continue to impede success for contact tracing, even 
when it is automated with a smartphone app. We now turn to consider the current or proposed solutions 
and how, even if not completely successful, they might be better designed and promoted in order to produce 
a lasting benefit for the average individual and wider community. 
Solution Option 1: Oxford/NHS App 
The United Kingdom breakout box describes the app being rolled out by the UK government and NHS. We 
refer to it as the Oxford/NHS app since its development was led by academics at Oxford. The government 
are pinning their hopes on this app being a key enabler for relaxing the current lockdown policy. Appendix 
3 discusses the common properties and data being collected by CTA reviewed during this research. We 
believe the statistics and overall proposal to support development of the app and promote its uptake in the 
community are based on best-case scenarios.  However, we do perceive that the strength of Government 
and NHS support comes from the perception of trust they seek to engender. The openness and degree of 
transparency that the NHS and Oxford teams have been upselling in the media, if delivered, far exceed that 
of any other. We found no other State-developed or operated solution that suggested a willingness to allow 
the media, technologists and general public access to the source code. However, early non-published 
results of a pilot trial on the Isle of Wight are less encouraging with a major limiting factor being the variation 
in smartphone operating systems, especially those of older phones (Duell, 2020). The level of transparency 
underpinning the NHS solution needs to also be adopted in any use of the APIs provided by the 
Apple/Google collaboration. 
Solution Option 2: Chan/Spector Symptom Tracker App merged 
with CTA 
In late March 2020 a collaboration between Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, 
Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust and King’s College London released their COVID-19 
Symptom Tracker (Drew et al, 2020). They currently have 2.8 million users and report symptoms data 
gathered from around 1.6 million, of whom only a tiny fraction of 1,176 (0.07%) had undergone some form 
of PCR-based diagnostic test (Drew et al, 2020). Many issues may present with this type of study. These 
issues include the subjective nature of the endeavor, the bias that comes from the fact that the app was 
initially promoted to and installed by clinical staff and their families, and that many in the wider community 
who voluntarily install such apps are the worried well who, when prompted with questions suggesting the 
symptoms that go with a condition, are more likely to identify as having some of them. Unless carefully 
managed, suggestibility unintentionally induces conditioned associations between symptoms, leading 
patients to report more intense or additional flu-like symptoms (Skelton et al, 1993).  
 Leaving these issues aside we believe a good solution might have been to incorporate CTA into 
this Symptom Tracker app, and allow the existing user-base to either consent or decline providing that 
additional information. That a high number of existing users would consent to the addition is far more likely 
than believing that almost 3 million people will install a second COVID-19 related app. We also believe that 
any proposed CTA solution should contemplate capture of many of the same symptom-based data-points, 
whether used directly in contact tracing or not. We suggest this in order to enable future anonymous 
aggregation and data mining/knowledge engineering on COVID-19 from what could be a considerably much 
larger and richer dataset. 
Solution Option 3: Bayesian network based COVID-19 CTA 
Our proposed solution focuses on enabling users to diagnose the possible presence of Covid-19 
themselves. This is done through a causal probabilistic model (a Bayesian network, that we describe in 
Section 4.1) that is made available in a smartphone app based on the architectural framework (that we 
describe in Section 4.2). The app provides the user with information about how likely it is they have or have 
not mild or severe Covid-19. When this probabilistic information is combined with data about the GPS-
location of the smartphone, together with information about the age group of the person the triple (Prob. 
user has Covid-19, GPS-location, Age-group) can be used to provide information about the distribution of 
mild and severe Covid-19. For example using colour shades on the map of a country, the data can be used 
to present a dynamic visualization of the probability distribution on the location where that information was 
collected (Hay et al, 2013). This solution option involves providing diagnostic-oriented feedback to citizens 
with real time Covid-19 surveillance and minimal privacy infringement as quickly as possible in the face of 
all the limitations of the current constantly changing situation. Response measures from the information 
collected from this option operate mainly at the population location level, such as intensified lockdown, 
social/physical distancing and self-isolation campaigns rather than more granular contact tracing and 
individual isolation measures requiring massive resource deployment. This option is dramatically different 
from the many trace and contact app solutions provided elsewhere. 
4.1 The Bayesian network (BN) for providing feedback on user symptoms  
A Bayesian network (BN)  (Cowell et al, 1999; Fenton and Neil 2018, Koller & Friedman, 2009; 
Pearl, 1988) is a graphical model consisting of nodes and arcs as shown in Figure 4 (this is the draft model 
we propose for our app). Some of the variables (such as those representing symptom nodes) may be 
directly observable while others (such as the COVID-19 node) are not. There is an arc between two nodes 
if the corresponding variables are causally linked in a probabilistic sense. The strength of the link, as well 
as the uncertainty associated with these, is captured using probabilities and statistical distributions. When 
data are entered into the model for specific variables that are observed, all of the probabilities for, as yet, 
unknown variables are updated using an AI algorithm called Bayesian inference. Hence, in the model here, 
the BN algorithm computes the probability of having none, mild, or severe COVID-19 , based on present 
signs and symptoms and other relevant background information entered by the user.  
The model makes a number of simplifying, but rational assumptions. For example, it assumes: that 
a person can only become infected if they have been in recent contact with an infected person (or some 
biological matter from an infected person);  that a positive test result from a perfectly accurate COVID19 
test procedure would mean that the person has COVID19 (even if they were asymptomatic); that there may 
be other conditions such as COPD or flu that have some symptoms in common with COVID-19.  
 
The probability distributions in the model for the symptoms given the disease status (i.e. the status 
of the COVID-19 variable) are based on the statistics provided in the paper by Huang et al. (2020). All the 
assumptions are described in Appendix 5. 
 
Figure 4: Covid-19 Bayesian network model structure. The probabilities shown for the 
COVID19 status node represent the prior probabilities when no observations are entered. 
 
Figure 5 shows the updated predicted probabilities with some user entered observations; in this 
example a user has many of the COVID19 symptoms and has had multiple recent interactions with other 
people. Although this user has not entered their background or risk factors, the model infers there is a 76% 
probability the person has Covid19 (66% probability severe and 11% probability mild). Note that the model 
also updates the probabilities for the unknown risk factors and background nodes. For example, this person 
is more likely to be male than female (56%) and is likely to be over 65 (54% probability). The probability of 
obesity is 12% (up from a prior of 10%). These backward inferences are simply the application of Bayes.  
Appendix 5 illustrates the power of the model through other scenarios.  
 
 
 Figure 5: Covid-19 BN model for a user with most CODID19 symptoms and multiple recent 
interactions with other people (nodes with observations are denoted with a scenario label). 
 
 
Depending on the value of the ‘alert threshold’ that is set the model will trigger an alert (it will trigger 
a separate hospitalization alert depending on the length of time the symptoms have been present and 
whether or not they are improving). So those people with the app who have come into contact with the 
person will be alerted that they have been in contact with a person most likely to be Covid19 positive, while 
this person could be given appropriate instructions for contacting the health authorities.  
This model is still an incomplete attempt at developing a BN for the prediction of the presence of 
Covid-19 (we are in the process of gathering the relevant data required to complete all of the probability 
tables; currently those for which we do not have relevant data, or are  not logically determined, are simply 
estimated). It is possible to add other signs and symptoms (for example dizziness seems useful) and also 
comorbidities and immunodeficiency could be added, as the literature provides the relevant information.  
The advantage of a BN is that it can still generate predictions with incomplete information. Thus, if 
certain evidence is not entered by the user, the model is able to use prior probabilistic information rather 
than make particular assumptions. So, although body temperature and oxygen saturation are key 
measurements, the user decides whether or not these measurements are actually done. Using the BN it is 
also possible to predict which feature will be the most informative one in contributing to the diagnosis, and 
this feature can be used to request additional information from the app’s user after some initial input. 
4.2 Design of the BayesCOVID Surveillance Framework 
The envisioned use of such a probabilistic BN model is as a foundation of population surveillance 
of the geographical outbreak and spread of Covid-19. The proposed infrastructure for personalised Covid-
19 status feedback and collecting geographical data is shown in Figure 5, and is inspired by related 
research of the authors’ research groups (van der Heijden et al, 2013; Velikova et al, 2014). 
  
Figure 5: Infrastructure for personalised Covid-19 feedback and collecting geographical Covid-19 
data. 
  
As Figure 5 illustrates, the BN is embedded or integrated into an app meant to run on a person’s 
smartphone. The presentation of the feedback is expected to be attractive and easily understood by the 
smartphone user with additional advice whether or not it is wise to contact a GP.  
This solution operates within the CardiPro environment using the Web/PWA front-end and Agena 
CloudAPI (McLachlan et al, 2020). Our research group has the means now to demonstrate both the 
elements and the entire solution presented in Figure 5. The minimalist data transmitted to the server, even 
if coupled with collecting a similar anonymous symptom set as used for the Chan/Spector app, might be 
more palatable to people who may be concerned about privacy in both the UK and Netherlands. 
In summary, in this proposed solution, it is assumed that a citizen of a country obtains feedback 
about the likelihood of the presence of mild or severe Covid-19 from a smartphone app, but the main 
purpose of making an app with the BN embedded is to monitor the population for detecting new outbreaks 
and the locations at which this occurs as early as possible. For this purpose, it is only needed that the 
minimalistic data triple (Prob. user has Covid-19, GPS-location, Age-group) is collected centrally. The age 
information might be useful to get information about required protection of particular groups. In addition it 
might be useful to also add an app-specific unique identifier so that it is possible to follow the progress of 
Covid-19 in the individual (possibly until hospital admission). However, collecting only the above-mentioned 
data triple has the advantage of minimal infringement of privacy. 
Discussion 
On installing CTA some personally identifiable information is always captured as a result of downloading 
the app from the app store, and for some apps, like the Australian and UK ones, when registering on first 
use (Maddocks, 2020). At a minimum, this is information which when combined with the metadata being 
generated makes every user and their associations identifiable. We contend that many claims regarding 
privacy and efficacy of CTA for COVID-19 in these papers may not be justified, and in some cases are 
misleading. We are not the first to identify the falsity of attempts at CTA privacy (Berke et al, 2020; Kuhn et 
al, 2020), nor to raise concern regarding the efficacy and applicability of CTA for COVID-19 contact tracing. 
However, we are the first to consider both issues together, and as a result to demonstrate that Bluetooth 
CTA are not the COVID-19 panacea we all seek. 
The UK and several other countries including Australia, Singapore and Germany, propose a 
centralised approach whereby data will be collected on smartphones and some component of that data is 
forwarded to a central server, enabling contact alerting and tracing of the epidemic. Some countries favour 
use of the solution presented by the Apple and Google Partnership, which is claimed to be a ‘local’ solution 
under development that will not breach data security and will not lead to any centralisation of data. Their 
proposal for privacy-safe contact tracing using Bluetooth would, they say, require explicit user consent,  
which is another issue that needs greater 
consideration. The Apple/Google solution APIs on 
first blush don’t appear to collect personally 
identifiable information or user location data, and 
suggest a list of people you’ve been in contact with 
never leaves your phone (detected via Bluetooth LE). 
We are also told that people who test positive are not 
identified to other users, Google or Apple. That the 
information would only be used for contact tracing by 
public health authorities for Covid-19 pandemic 
management which in itself, like every other 
proposed decentralised system would necessitate 
communication with and storage of data in some 
form of central server. However, with regard to 
metadata and privacy, we are circumspect that 
Apple/Google or the various HA using their APIs will 
not be collecting at least part of the data being 
generated for secondary use purposes. It should also 
be noted that the Apple/Google APIs are simply an 
interface for HAs to expedite development of CTA 
solutions: they are not a CTA. APIs act as a 
standardised intermediary, in this case between the 
user interface and a data backend, both of which will 
still require HAs to engage software architects and 
developers to create. There is no guarantee that 
without engaging far more experienced technologists 
and serious reconsideration, any app the NHS 
develop using the Apple/Google APIs will not fare as 
badly as the first 24 hours of real-world testing of the 
NHSX CTA on the Isle of Wight (Duell, 2020). If we 
are to use these APIs, a better solution might be a 
Progressive Web App (PWA). A single PWA could be 
developed to be compatible with both Android and 
Apple architectures, and engineered to avoid the 
main issue seen with the NHS trial app: 
incompatibility with variants of the smartphone’s 
operating system. We have already developed and 
demonstrated an example of this approach, called 
CardiPro (McLachlan et al, 2020). 
It can be inferred from the literature, mass 
media and download pages of those developing and 
promoting CTA, that to at least some degree they 
seek to create the belief that implementation of 
contact tracing makes containment of COVID-19 a 
fait accompli. Each presents a solution couched in 
words suggesting that, for successful eradication of COVID-19, we need only to install the CTA, and in 
doing so we will have identified everyone who, symptomatic or asymptomatic, might have the disease. 
However, this assumes the data collected by the CTA will be clean, accurate and sufficiently complete, and 
Australia 
Rather than develop their own app, the Australian 
Government licensed rights to rebrand the 
TraceTogether app developed by the Singaporean 
Government, and deploy it as COVIDSafe. As is 
common, emergency legislation was hurriedly drafted 
and enacted under the catchy title: Biosecurity (Human 
Biosecurity Emergency)(Human Coronavirus with 
Pandemic Potential)(Emergency Requirements - 
Public Health Contact Information) Determination 2020 
Act (PHCIA, 2020). While making it an offence for a 
person outside those employed by a state or federal 
health authority to collect, use or disclose COVID app 
data except for the purposes of contact tracing (Section 
6(1) & (2)), this determination explicitly limits the same 
provision to data generated within the app or by the 
Commonwealth and stored on the user’s mobile 
device. PHCIA also excludes from all provisions, 
privacy or otherwise, information arising from any 
source other than the National COVIDSafe data store 
(Section 6(3)). The effect of provisions of the PHCIA 
make it unlawful for an app user or member of the 
general public to decrypt, view or disseminate any data 
from their device, or even knowledge about data that 
the app collects or stores, while leaving Government 
organisations able to interact with this data more freely.  
     The PHCIA contracts itself out of provisions of the 
Privacy Act 1998 that may be found inconsistent under 
power of Section 477(5) of the Biosecurity Act 2015, 
but does not exclude itself from the operation of others, 
including the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (TIAA, 2018) which invokes data 
retention provisions on telecommunications providers, 
including your telephony and internet service 
providers, and Amazon Web Services who will be the 
web host of the central server, to store records of all 
forms of electronic communication for at least two 
years. The TIAA also makes metadata available 
without warrant to a broad range of organisations that 
include law enforcement, local, state and federal 
government bodies, the RSPCA, the Australian Navy 
and Border Protection Services, the Thoroughbred 
horse and greyhound racing associations, Workplace 
Safety investigators, the Clean Energy Regulator, 
National Measurement Institute, Building and 
Construction Commission, Taxi Services Commission 
and in some cases it has been demonstrated, private 
investigators (Farrell, 2016; Guy, 2015).   
will fully support their containment efforts which, despite best intentions, is extremely unlikely (Senga et al, 
2017). We accept that solutions operating at the front end of contact tracing, like the CTA, will produce 
more data. More contact information will require time-consuming and labour-intensive follow-up, and 
consumption of considerable resources in order to identify and weed out the true cases from the spurious 
chatter (Senga et al, 2017). But it should be noted that previous work has failed to consider:  
a) the effect of people simply leaving their smartphone at home, or in the car;  
b) how to effectively deal with people who might have two or more devices; or 
c) how to identify the owners of prepaid devices that in some countries can be registered without 
identification, or anonymously.  
d) the effect of a CTA user coming into close physical contact with others who eschew, or cannot 
afford, smartphones (all previous work assumed that the adjectives pervasive and ubiquitous meant 
complete coverage).  
We believe that care should be taken when deploying CTA in any community. Not just because of 
privacy or consent issues. But rather, to ensure that even the most suggestible member of our community 
does not become complacent and assume that CTA operates, as claims like those provided with the 
Australian Government COVIDSafe app would seem to suggest, as an invisible shield making us and our 
families impenetrable or immune to the disease.  
Even if all potential privacy issues were resolved, the decision to install and register the CTA in 
most western countries would remain voluntary. This raises the question: How can high-level uptake of the 
CTA be assured? To answer this question we propose that at least three related matters must be 
considered: (i) public compliance with existing social distancing measures; (ii) media narrative of CTA; and, 
(iii) ongoing changes in peoples’ subjective estimate of severity and susceptibility to the virus.  
Opinion polls in recent weeks are finding that 
the majority in each country are in favour of existing 
social distancing measures, irrespective of how strictly 
they are maintained and for how long they remain 
(Ipsos-mori, 2020a). When compared to other 
countries, people in the UK are displaying a higher 
degree of support for continued social distancing. 
Similarly, the UK population has shown overwhelming 
support for lockdown measures, again irrespective of 
severity and duration of the lockdown. It may be that 
this public acceptance will extend to other State-
operated measures including the suggested test, track 
and trace strategy that includes the CTA, as it is being 
promoted as a way to end the lockdown and reduce 
the possibility for additional and more severe lockdown 
measures. It is possible that, irrespective of how 
privacy-invading CTA methods may be, or the 
potential negative impact that third-party use of 
metadata resulting from individual engagement with 
the app, the public may accept these impositions in 
return for the benefits of a lifted lockdown and lighter 
social distancing measures. Certainly, the polling 
conducted between the 10th to 13th of April 2020 in the 
UK suggests this holds true, with 65% showing support 
for the CTA (Ipsos-mori, 2020b). However, public 
opinion elsewhere is somewhat mixed. 
In other countries the trade-off is not the same: the protection of privacy outweighs relaxed social 
distancing through use of a CTA. For example: (i) in France, where 53% of respondents are opposed to the 
CTA (Hughes Hubbard, 2020); and, (ii) the US, where 50% of respondents are opposed to the CTA, 
(Kirzinger et al, 2020). The US poll also showed opinion somewhat changes when benefits such as going 
back to work are more prominently presented, in which case 66% would agree to download the CTA. 
However, from 64% of the US total sample 17% indicated that a CTA would make them feel less safe, while 
47% said the CTA would make no difference to their feelings of safety at all. The current media narrative 
and an individual’s subjective estimates of severity and susceptibility are two broad factors that, whilst not 
United Kingdom 
While drawing significant criticism, the UK National 
Health Service (NHS) has rejected the Apple/Google 
APIs and decentralised model, expressly favouring a 
centralised approach that they say will allow for 
collection of more granular data and broader analysis 
to study and track the pandemic (Hamilton, 2020). 
The key difference to be noted between the NHS 
approach and all others is upfront acknowledgement 
of the intention to maintain this central collection of 
data while also making substantial claims regarding 
the privacy strength of the userland app and ethics of 
their approach. Unlike descriptions of all other 
claimed privacy-preserving apps seen in the COVID-
19 literature, and in stark contrast to the Australian 
approach of denying the public any real knowledge of 
the data being collected and transmitted by their 
device (PHCIA, 2020), the NHS are making 
encouraging noises regards allowing researchers, 
security analysts and the general public access to the 
source code, to see behind the curtain and verify 
what data the app is collecting and transmitting 
(Gould & Lewis, 2020). Unlike any other, and if taken 
on face value, this could allow UK citizens to consider 
that data’s existence and potential uses when 
deciding whether to download and activate the app 
on our personal devices.  
independent of each other, account for the observed differences in opinion and behaviour both between 
countries and over time (Abeysinghe & White, 2011; Leppin & Aro, 2009; Slovic, 2000; Wagner-Egger et 
al, 2011; Wheaton et al 2011).  
The contentious issue of privacy presents as a far more salient and palatable target than dealing 
with the overwhelming lack of evidence for efficacy. On these issues there are now several open letters 
from scientists that are being communicated to the general public. While the sustained focus on data privacy 
concerns remains strong in the mainstream media, this negative issue will dominate public understanding 
of CTAs and significantly restrain uptake. If the narrative can be drawn towards the potential benefits for 
everyone that come from a general loosening of restrictions to open schools and workplaces, then the 
success we have seen in compliance with the current lockdown may allow these people to accept the trade-
off and come out in favour of the CTA. Naturally, this won’t be isolated from individual’s estimates of severity 
and susceptibility to the virus, and by extension, for those close to them. But if there is a sufficiently strong 
belief that severity and susceptibility is high in those close to oneself, even if the severity and/or 
susceptibility is low for themselves, then, just as we have seen with compliance to lockdown measures, 
compliance with State messaging on voluntarily using a CTA may also be high. 
Many proposed solutions, even the 
Google/Apple collaboration, focus very heavily on 
privacy and app distribution and make almost no 
mention regarding accuracy. Despite best 
intentions, the levels of inaccuracy that arise in 
any data recording mean that any contact tracing, 
manual or digital, will always be incomplete 
(Senga et al, 2017). Even when we have a 
significant proportion that do comply with contact 
tracing, we often still have poor data arising out of 
the methods employed to collect the data. The 
normal inaccuracies that occur in data recording 
and data entry are amplified with contact tracing 
because some people simply don’t want to be 
traced, while others have limited socio-cultural 
understanding for why we are wanting to trace 
them (Senga et al, 2017). Contact tracing 
represents an expensive win/lose situation. A 
very small group of university researchers and 
technology companies receive a large funding 
boost to develop the CTA and deal with the data 
that it collects, and a large number of people 
involved in manual contact tracing win jobs. 
However, the overall community suffers more 
significant risks, and losses, when they choose to 
re-engage in normal behaviours under the false 
sense of hope that most CTA are promoted as 
giving, and risk becoming infected and infecting 
their family, potentially leading to death.  
We are sceptical that any standalone contact tracing approach, manual or automated, could contain 
a high-prevalence highly contagious disease like COVID-19. This is primarily because the CTA acts 
retrospectively. It advises the user they were previously in close contact with an infected, and in the case 
of COVID-19, this advice often comes only after they have already begun asymptomatically shedding the 
disease. The primary (third) solution we propose integrates the retrospective CTA with symptom tracking 
and a BN, providing the user with a prospective view of the probability that they may have contracted 
COVID-19. In this way we increase CTA utility for users. We believe that with increased utility uptake may 
be improved, as is the opportunity to collect useful data and identify actionable clinical knowledge to 
improve the response in future disease outbreaks. Solutions like the one proposed here can have a very 
beneficial effect on containing the spread of infection.   
One final point that returns to the issue of consent that was raised earlier. For many proposing 
CTA, the idea of using an app instead of just network tracing via the cellular network or other means is not 
The data being collected 
Drawn from many of the cited papers in this work, most 
apps will collect and transmit some subset of the following 
data fields: 
● MAC address of your device’s Bluetooth or Wi-Fi 
chip 
● Your Phone number (or IMEI number if the device 
does not easily report the subscriber phone 
number) 
● The MAC address of other people your phone 
sees (Bluetooth handshakes with everything it 
sees that is also Bluetooth, even when it doesn’t 
know the device and has never been paired with 
it) 
● The time, date and in some cases, location data 
from your GPS for each new interaction with 
another in-range device (accurate to about 15 
meters). A new interaction is when your device 
sees another device move into its broadcast area. 
Note that in a corporate office the app might see 
the device of someone in the next room move into 
and out of range tens or hundreds of times over 
the course of a working day. 
● The Bluetooth or device name of the smartphone 
that is running the app, and every other Bluetooth 
device that crosses into its broadcast range. This 
last point can more easily enable re-identification 
as people often name their smartphone ‘Tim’s 
iPhone’ or similar. 
as much about Bluetooth being more accurate, it is about the idea of claiming to have informed consent: 
that by downloading the app and clicking through a privacy agreement they have received ‘informed 
consent’ to access and monitor an individual through their device. In studies evaluating the impact and 
effect of privacy policies and user agreements it was found that 54% are written in language 
unapproachable by most people (Jensen et al, 2004), 40% of participants do not even recall seeing the 
agreement while clicking through to install the app (Good et al, 2005), and only 0.24% of more than 55,000 
actually clicked or scrolled to view the policy (Jensen et al, 2004). Most users have no idea what they have 
agreed to, and given that organisations change their policies and agreements regularly, whether the current 
version of the agreement is consistent with that which the media may have discussed when the CTA was 
being rolled out. Given these findings, is it ethical to consider that when users install and register the CTA, 
the inclusion of a long privacy policy and user agreement that potentially more than half of the population 
will be unable to comprehend constitutes informed consent?  
Conclusion 
In writing this paper we reviewed a large collection of topical works on COVID-19. Most works were recent 
preprints proposing CTA solutions for containment of the disease, while others presented the latest 
research and evaluation of the spread of the disease in our communities. While there is a focus in the 
literature on two issues, privacy and efficacy, the current media narrative for CTA in many countries strongly 
emphasises perceived privacy risks, and in the UK especially, the risks some attach to the NHS decision 
to eschew the presumed leading solution: the Apple/Google collaboration.  
We also sought to simulate the operation of CTA, and the results of our calculations appear largely 
in agreement with those of other groups just published. Introduction of a new CTA alone would not contain 
the disease, and the best-case sweet spot for uptake is beyond that which could conceivably be achieved. 
However, by providing people with an understanding not just retrospectively for whether they have been in 
contact with an infected previously, but also using a Bayesian approach to proactively provide the 
probability that they might have the disease, we can increase the CTAs utility to users while potentially 
improving the uptake and knowledge to be learned from use of the app. When combined with an effective 
communication strategy and sensible social distancing, we believe solutions like the one proposed here 
can have a very beneficial effect on containing the spread of this pandemic and reducing the need for 
draconian lockdown procedures.  
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